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Articles
Denying Secured Creditors the Right to
Credit Bid in Chapter 11 Cases and the
Risk of Undervaluation
Alan N. Resnick*
The Bankruptcy Code has reached a delicate balance between protecting the rights of
secured creditors and providing financially troubled companies with flexibility in
reorganizing their businesses. One protection that has been available to secured creditors is
the right to “credit bid” at any sale of collateral free of liens, which allows the creditor to buy
the property by offsetting its claim against the purchase price instead of paying cash. This
right is designed to assure that property is not sold free of security interests at a price that is
below the collateral’s true value. An inadequate sales price deprives the creditor of the full
benefit of its security interest. The importance of credit bidding has grown as asset sales have
become more common in chapter 11 cases.
Despite the universal view during the past three decades that the right to credit bid was
essentially guaranteed when property is sold under a chapter 11 plan, two recent
controversial decisions—the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber Co. and the
Third Circuit’s decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC—curtailed this protection
by holding that a secured lender may be denied the right to credit bid when its collateral is
sold under a chapter 11 plan if the bankruptcy court makes a judicial finding that the
creditor will realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its secured claim without credit bidding.
These recent circuit court decisions have shifted the balance between the rights of lien
holders and the rights of financially troubled borrowers in a way that affords less protection
to secured creditors and greater flexibility to chapter 11 debtors. This Article analyzes these
cases and discusses the impact these decisions will have on the chapter 11 sale process,
creditor expectations and behavior, and the cost and availability of credit. This Article will
also discuss the recent Seventh Circuit decision in River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, which rejected the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Philadelphia
Newspapers, thereby causing a circuit split. The Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to
review the Seventh Circuit decision, is likely to resolve these important issues soon.

* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School
of Law; of counsel to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York. The Author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable assistance of Daniel Vaillant, an associate, and Keely Hamlin, a summer
associate, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, in the preparation of this Article.
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Introduction
A goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the preservation of
value of a distressed company through reorganization or a sale of the
company’s assets. This goal often conflicts with property rights of entities
that are not in bankruptcy. In striving to save businesses, thereby saving
jobs and maximizing recovery for creditors, the Bankruptcy Code has
reached a delicate balance between the protection of property rights of
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lien holders and the maximization of value for the benefit of all
stakeholders in the enterprise.
The protection of property rights in a bankruptcy case is not merely
a matter of legislative preference or economic policy. In Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Supreme Court held that a
prebankruptcy security interest in property of a debtor is constitutionally
1
protected by the Fifth Amendment. Since that landmark decision, courts
have held that impairment of a secured creditor’s lien position by reason
of the bankruptcy laws constitutes an impermissible taking of property
2
without just compensation.
The constitutional protection of property rights does not mean,
however, that secured creditors are unscathed during the reorganization
process. In furthering its value-maximization and reorganization policies,
the Bankruptcy Code infringes on the rights of secured creditors in a
number of ways. For example, the automatic stay under section 362(a)
3
prohibits foreclosure by a secured creditor upon the debtor’s default, a
4
right the secured creditor would have under applicable state law. A
secured creditor also may have to tolerate the debtor’s substitution of its
5
collateral with other property. A secured creditor on a debt that
matured before the filing of the bankruptcy petition also may be
compelled under a plan of reorganization to accept deferred cash
payments over a period of several years with interest at a rate that is
6
lower than the rate applicable in the absence of bankruptcy. All of these
impositions on a secured creditor’s rights in the debtor’s property, among
others, can be achieved over the objection of the secured creditor. As the
Supreme Court has written:
Property rights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the
bankruptcy court because created and protected by state law. Most
property rights are so created and protected. But if Congress is acting
within its bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to
affect these property rights, provided the limitations of the due process
7
clause are observed.

1. 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of
Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”).
2. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc.), 2 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. 715, 719 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010).
4. U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1) (2011).
5. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes that a secured creditor may be “adequately protected” by
receiving an additional or replacement lien in other property to the extent of any decrease in value of
the original collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (2010).
6. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
7. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 518 (1938) (emphasis added). The Court
quoted from Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937), referring
to its holding in Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227 (1931):
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Despite provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that alter secured
creditors’ rights, the Code contains provisions designed to assure the
adequate protection of the secured creditor’s interest in collateral
consistent with the Fifth Amendment mandate. Indeed, the right to
adequate protection of its lien is given a higher priority than the
reorganization policy. For example, a secured creditor has an absolute
right to relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on its collateral if the
debtor fails to provide the secured creditor with adequate protection of
8
its lien. Similarly, the continued use of the collateral by the debtor must
be prohibited, conditioned, or modified to the extent that such use will
9
deprive the lien holder of adequate protection. Thus, if collateral is
depreciating, the automatic stay must be terminated or modified, or the
debtor’s use of the collateral must be prohibited or limited, unless the
trustee or debtor in possession makes periodic cash payments, grants a
replacement lien, or provides some other means of assuring that the
10
creditor will realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its lien. The Code
requires the termination of the automatic stay to permit foreclosure by a
secured creditor based on the lack of adequate protection, regardless of
whether such relief will destroy any prospects for a successful
reorganization of the debtor and the adverse consequences that may
11
result from such termination.
Particular challenges in balancing the rights of lienors and the
reorganization policy occur when creditors are undersecured because the
value of collateral is less than the amount of the debt. In general, if the
value of the collateral is less than the amount of the debt, under
section 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the creditor’s claim is treated
as a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and as an unsecured
12
claim for the deficiency. The secured claim has a higher priority in the
distribution scheme in bankruptcy with respect to its collateral, while
unsecured claims often realize only pennies on the dollar.
In view of such bifurcation, a potential danger faced by secured
creditors in chapter 11 cases is the risk that the collateral will be

A court of bankruptcy may affect the interests of lien holders in many ways. To carry out
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, it may direct that all liens upon property forming a
part of the bankrupt’s estate be marshalled; or that the property be sold free of
encumbrances and the rights of all lien holders be transferred to the proceeds of the sale.
Wright, 300 U.S. at 470.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (requiring the bankruptcy court to grant a party’s request for relief from
the automatic stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of the party’s property
interest).
9. See id. § 363(e).
10. See id. § 361.
11. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07[3][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed. 2010).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010).
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undervalued, thus depriving the creditor of the full benefit of its lien.
Such undervaluation could arise in a number of contexts. For example, if
a secured creditor moves for relief from the automatic stay on the ground
that its collateral is depreciating and is not adequately protected, the
court could conduct a hearing and make a determination as to the value
of the collateral. Much ink has been spilled over the proper way for
courts to value collateral, but regardless of the methodology employed in
a judicial valuation, such valuation is not an exact science and is subject
13
to error.
The most accurate method for determining the value of collateral is
to conduct a true market test in the form of a public auction with courtapproved bidding procedures designed to attract the highest and best
offer. As the Supreme Court said in Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, “[u]nder a plan
granting an exclusive right, making no provision for competing bids or
competing plans, any determination that the price was top dollar would
necessarily be made by a judge in bankruptcy court, whereas the best
14
way to determine value is exposure to a market.” However, if the
debtor desires to retain ownership of the collateral, a true market test
through a public auction is not possible. Therefore, out of necessity,
judicial valuation of property is a part of the chapter 11 process.
The Bankruptcy Code includes certain provisions designed to
protect secured lenders against a judicial undervaluation when the
debtor will keep the collateral, either during the chapter 11 case or under
a plan of reorganization. For example, section 507(b) gives the secured
creditor a “superpriority” administrative expense claim (an administrative
expense claim with priority over other administrative expense claims) to
the extent that “adequate protection” granted to the creditor and
approved by the court eventually falls short and proves to have been
15
inadequate with the benefit of hindsight by the end of the case.
Another protection against judicial undervaluation of a secured
creditor’s collateral in connection with a plan of reorganization is section
1111(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which generally permits the holder
of a nonrecourse mortgage to assert an unsecured deficiency claim
against the estate unless the debtor sells the collateral during the case or
16
under a chapter 11 plan. The unsecured deficiency claim would not exist
outside of bankruptcy or in a chapter 7 case because of the nonrecourse

13. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty,
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930 (2006); Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation
Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 387 (2005).
14. 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2010).
16. Id. § 1111(b)(1). See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1111.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
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nature of the debt, but is recognized in chapter 11. Although the
creditor may be harmed by judicial undervaluation of the collateral, that
harm may be mitigated to some extent by giving the creditor a
distribution on a fictitious unsecured deficiency claim.
Section 1111(b)(2) goes even further in protecting creditors against
undervaluation of their collateral by allowing a class of undersecured
creditors to elect to have their claims treated as fully secured claims in
18
certain circumstances. The effect of such an election is that the total
amount owed to a secured creditor in that class will not be subject to
bifurcation into secured and unsecured deficiency claims under
section 506(a). Such protection is not absolute and judicial valuation of
collateral may be necessary; but if the debtor retains the collateral under
a chapter 11 plan, in order to satisfy the requirements for confirmation
under section 1129(b) the secured creditors in a section 1111(b)(2)
electing class must receive under the plan deferred cash payments that, in
the aggregate, equal at least the amount of the debt regardless of any
19
judicial valuation. Such cash payments must also have a present value of
at least the value of the collateral as determined by the court, unless the
20
class votes to accept a plan with a different treatment. Thus, although
the court values the collateral to determine whether the present value of
the deferred cash payments is sufficient, the plan must provide that
secured creditors will receive a cash stream that, in the aggregate, equals
the full amount of their total claims. For example, if a secured creditor in
a class that elects treatment under section 1111(b)(2) has a $1 million
claim secured by collateral that the judge determines is worth only
$200,000, and the plan is confirmed despite the secured creditor’s
nonacceptance, the plan must provide for deferred cash payments that
have a present value of at least $200,000 but which total at least $1
million. However, the right to make an election under section 1111(b)(2)
does not apply if the secured creditor has recourse against the debtor and
21
the collateral is sold during the case or under a chapter 11 plan. Thus,
the protection against judicial undervaluation in section 1111(b)(2) is
designed primarily to protect secured creditors when property is retained
by the debtor. When property is sold free and clear of a lien either during
the case or under a plan, the secured creditor does not need the

17. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2010); see also 7 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 16,
¶ 1111.03[1][a][ii][B] (“If section 1111(b)(1) was not included in the Code and the creditor agreed not
to assert a deficiency claim against the debtor personally . . . section 502(b)(1) would require the
bankruptcy court to enforce the contract . . . and disallow a deficiency claim.”).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(B). The right to make the election also does not apply if the lien is of
inconsequential value.
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protection of section 1111(b) because it should be protected from
undervaluation by an auction process.
Although an auction process should produce an accurate test of the
collateral’s market value, the Bankruptcy Code does not assume that
auctions are always going to provide secured creditors with true market
value when collateral is to be sold. In particular, section 363(k) provides
an important protection designed to assure that property is not sold by
the bankruptcy estate outside of a chapter 11 plan at a price that is below
true market value. Section 363(k) provides secured creditors with the
right to bid when collateral is sold during the bankruptcy case and, if a
secured creditor purchases the property, it may offset its secured claim
against the purchase price instead of paying cash, unless the court orders
22
otherwise for cause. This right is often referred to as the right to “credit
23
bid.” Most significant, the secured creditor may credit bid up to its
entire debt amount without being limited to a judicially determined
24
valuation of the collateral. For example, if the debt is $100,000 and the
highest cash bidder offers to purchase the collateral for $60,000, the
secured creditor, believing that the collateral is worth more than $60,000,
could submit a higher bid, say $70,000, without the need to provide any
cash, thus assuring that the secured creditor will not have to accept the
proceeds received at a faulty or inadequate auction.
Another provision designed to protect a secured creditor against the
risk of undervaluation as a result of an inadequate auction is section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which has been construed by the clear weight of
authority to give secured creditors the right to credit bid when collateral
is sold free and clear of liens under a chapter 11 plan that was not
25
supported by the secured creditor’s class. However, two recent court of
appeals decisions—the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber
Co.—have undermined this protection by allowing courts to deprive a
secured creditor of the right to credit bid at an auction of the collateral in
a sale under a chapter 11 plan that the secured creditor’s class voted to
reject, so long as the court finds that the plan affords the secured creditor
26
the realization of the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.
Although one of those decisions, Philadelphia Newspapers, recognizes the
possibility that a public auction process could give the secured creditor

22. Id. § 363(k).
23. See, e.g., Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
459–61 (3d Cir. 2006).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel
Partners, LLC), 651 F.3d 642, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2011).
26. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
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the indubitable equivalent of its claim despite the denial of the right to
credit bid, the other decision, Pacific Lumber, went even further by
upholding the confirmation of a plan involving the transfer of the
collateral free and clear of liens and cash payment to the objecting
secured creditor based solely on a judicial valuation of the collateral—
thus depriving the secured creditor of any market-test valuation by
auction in a situation in which the collateral was transferred and not
27
retained by the debtor. The court concluded that the plan afforded the
28
creditor the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.
This Article discusses the effects of these recent decisions on the
risk of undervaluation of collateral faced by secured creditors when a
chapter 11 plan provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens
and deprives the secured creditor of the right to credit bid at the auction.
Part I addresses the right of a secured creditor to credit bid when
collateral is sold free and clear of liens during the bankruptcy case but
not under a chapter 11 plan. Part II discusses generally the requirements
for confirming a plan despite nonacceptance by a class of secured
creditors and how such requirements affect the right to credit bid at a
sale under a chapter 11 plan. Part III focuses on the recent decisions of
the Third and Fifth Circuits that have upheld plan confirmations despite
a denial of the right to credit bid. Part IV discusses a contrary decision of
the Seventh Circuit upholding the right to credit bid at asset sales under
chapter 11 plans, thereby creating a circuit split on these important
issues. Part V discusses the ramifications of the recent decisions
curtailing the right to credit bid.

I. The Right to Credit Bid at a Sale Under Section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code
Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that during a
bankruptcy case, a trustee or debtor in possession may, after notice and a
hearing, use, sell, or lease property of the estate outside the ordinary
29
course of business. Section 363(f) provides that, under certain
circumstances, such property may be sold to a third party free and clear
30
of liens and other property interests. If a secured creditor’s collateral is
sold free and clear of its lien, the lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale
31
for the benefit of the secured creditor.

27. See infra Part III for a discussion of these cases.
28. See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 249 (“We conclude that the MRC/Marathon plan . . . did
not violate the absolute priority rule, was fair and equitable, satisfies 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii),
and yielded a fair value of the Noteholders’ secured claim.”).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
30. Id. § 363(f).
31. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.06 (“It has long been recognized that the
bankruptcy court has the power to authorize the sale of property free of liens with the liens attaching
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In order to protect the secured creditor from a sale process that may
not produce the true market value of the collateral, section 363(k)
provides:
At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is
subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for
cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale,
and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder
32
may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.

Granting a secured creditor the right to credit bid when the debtor
is seeking to sell the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of liens,
thus using an offset of its claim as currency for the purchase price, was
not a new concept when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Credit
33
bidding was recognized under common law. While the Uniform
Commercial Code is silent on a secured creditor’s right to credit bid at a
foreclosure of the secured creditor’s collateral, at least one bankruptcy
court has found that a secured creditor’s right to credit bid is implicit in
34
the authorization for the secured creditor to buy at a public sale.
Congress sought to statutorily protect this right by including
35
section 363(k) in the Bankruptcy Code when it was enacted in 1978.
It is important to note that, as discussed above, the secured
creditor’s right to credit bid is not limited to a previous valuation under
36
section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the secured creditor
can credit bid the face amount of its claim, regardless of whether a
previous valuation provided the creditor with a claim bifurcated into
both secured and unsecured claims. In essence, the secured creditor’s bid
37
sets the value of the collateral. For example, suppose that a secured
creditor gives the debtor a $10 million full recourse loan, which was
secured by the debtor’s factory. At the time of the loan, the factory was
worth $6 million. Assume that the lien on the factory was properly

to the proceeds, with or without the consent of the lienholder.”).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k).
33. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.LH[1] (citing Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931); Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 128 (1874); Allebach v. Thomas (In re Nicholson), 16 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1927)).
34. In re Finova Capital Corp., 356 B.R. 609, 624–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Although [the UCC]
falls short of granting secured creditors a right to credit bid, it does grant them a right to ‘buy’ without
limiting the form of acceptable payment. Given that the [UCC] allows secured creditors to buy
and . . . [the UCC does not] prohibit credit bidding, it would be overly-formalistic to prohibit credit
bidding in this situation. As the proceeds of a sale under [the UCC] are used to pay the debt owed to
the secured creditor, it is ultimately inconsequential whether a secured creditor pays with cash or with
the reduction of debt. The end result is the same.”).
35. 124 Cong. Rec. S33,995 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong.
Rec. H32,396 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
36. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 460–61 (3d
Cir. 2006).
37. Id. (stating that one rationale behind the secured creditor’s right to credit bid is that “by
definition [the bid itself] becomes the value of [the lender’s] security interest in [the collateral]”).
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perfected and not subject to any infirmity. Subsequently, the debtor files
for chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, at which time the principal balance due
on the loan is still $10 million and the factory is worth $7 million
according to a valuation provided by the bankruptcy court. Under
section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the secured creditor has a
secured claim for $7 million and an unsecured deficiency claim for $3
million. If the debtor seeks to sell the factory during the bankruptcy case
under section 363(b), the secured creditor would be protected by its right
to credit bid up to the full amount of its claim, or $10 million, at a sale of
the factory. By becoming the winning bidder, the secured creditor would
buy the factory and, instead of paying any cash, its claim against the
debtor would be reduced by the amount of the credit bid. In this
scenario, the secured creditor would own the factory after the sale
without the need to pay any cash, and would have an unsecured
deficiency claim against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate for any difference
between the amount of the credit bid and the amount of the debt. If the
secured creditor bid the full $10 million, it would have no deficiency
claim. The creditor, as purchaser, would be free to keep the property
(hoping for price appreciation) or sell the property for a negotiated
amount or by conducting its own auction.
Presumably, a secured creditor will not credit bid unless it believes
that all other bidders will bid amounts that are less than the actual
38
market value of the collateral. The secured creditor would not want to
submit a credit bid above the true value of the collateral because, to the
extent that a credit bid exceeds the true value, the secured creditor
39
forfeits an unsecured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate. If
there will be no distribution to unsecured creditors, the loss of a
deficiency claim will have no adverse consequence. However, even if a
deficiency claim is worthless, the secured creditor ordinarily would not
want to bid more than the actual value of the collateral because it would
have to incur the costs of maintaining and reselling the collateral after
the purchase. Of course, if a third-party bidder believes the secured
creditor’s credit bid undervalues the collateral, it may bid a higher
amount and prevail at the auction, in which case the secured creditor’s
40
lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale. In that regard, the secured
creditor may have the advantage of familiarity with the debtor’s business
41
and greater information regarding the actual value of the assets. In any

38. Id. (stating that one rationale behind credit bidding is that a secured creditor would “not
outbid [a] [b]idder unless [the] [l]ender believe[d] it could generate a greater return on [the collateral]
than the return for [the] [l]ender represented by [the] [b]idder’s offer”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy
Auctions, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99, 120 (2010) (“As a secured party, the creditor wishing to credit
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event, the credit bidder has the distinct advantage in the auction process
because it need not use its cash or otherwise seek alternative financing to
make the purchase.
Section 363(k) was amended in 1984 to give bankruptcy courts the
42
discretion to preclude a secured creditor from credit bidding “for cause.”
However, because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “cause,” courts
have discretion to determine the circumstances that justify denial of such
43
right. In general, a court may deny the right to credit bid if such denial
is in the interest of furthering a policy advanced by the Bankruptcy
Code, such as when credit bidding would chill the bidding process or
44
would otherwise hinder the reorganization process. In particular,
bankruptcy courts have denied the right to credit bid for cause where the
court has found that (1) the debtor failed to notify other interested
parties (especially other secured creditors) of the asset sale, (2) the sale
to the credit bidder would be for an inadequate sale price, (3) there was a
bona fide dispute regarding the validity of the secured creditor’s lien, and
(4) the sale would be delayed and the value of property would be
45
diminished due to questions regarding the status of a creditor’s lien.
Despite the court’s discretion to deny the right to credit bid under
section 363(k), the presumption is that the right applies and the burden
to prove cause for the denial of such right is on the debtor or any other
party in interest who seeks to prevent the secured creditor from credit
46
bidding.

bid is likely more familiar with the debtor’s business and assets than are other prospective buyers.
Through its history of monitoring the debtor, the credit bidder may be privy to information about the
true value of the collateral the debtor is selling that is not apparent to other would-be bidders.”).
42. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2010).
43. Id. at 315–16.
44. Id. at 316 n.14 (“A court may deny a lender the right to credit bid in the interest of any policy
advanced by the Code, such as to ensure the success of the reorganization or to foster a competitive
bidding environment.” (citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.09[1])).
45. See, e.g., In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2010 WL 6634603, at *2
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[C]ourts have required secured creditors to put cash in escrow, pay a
portion of the bid in cash, or furnish a letter of credit when the amount and validity of an alleged
senior lien is in dispute.”); In re Takeout Taxi Holdings, Inc., 307 B.R. 525, 534 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004)
(holding that there was sufficient “cause” to deny credit bidding because four of the secured creditors
were not served with the sale motion and two did not receive a copy of the notice of the proposed
sale); In re Theroux, 169 B.R. 498, 499 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994) (holding that “cause” exists where the
“intended selling price is only a fraction of the fair market value” and “the sale, as proposed, [would]
benefit only the secured creditor, while inflicting [significant] financial damage upon the taxing
authorities”); In re Diebart Bancroft, Nos. 92-3744, 92-3745, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 836, at *15 (E.D.
La. Jan. 25, 1993) (regarding cause to deny the right to credit bid, the court held that “there was cause
shown: namely, the need for cash in escrow to satisfy the lien dispute”).
46. See In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 332–33 n.18.
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II. Credit Bidding at an Asset Sale Under a Chapter 11 Plan
In contrast to a section 363 asset sale during a bankruptcy case,
assets may also be sold under a chapter 11 plan. Section 1123(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code requires that every plan provide for adequate means
for the plan’s implementation, such as, among other possible actions, the
“sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or
47
free of any lien.” Moreover, section 1123(b), which sets forth optional
plan provisions, states that a plan may “provide for the sale of all or
48
substantially all of the property of the estate.”
A chapter 11 plan must be confirmed by the court for it to become
effective and binding on the parties, and section 1129 of the Bankruptcy
49
Code sets forth the requirements for confirmation. In most cases, the
debtor will seek the acceptance of the plan from all classes of claims and
50
equity interests that are impaired by the plan. If all impaired classes
accept the plan and a number of other requirements listed in section
51
1129(a) are satisfied, the plan may be confirmed. However, if an
impaired class does not accept the plan, it may be confirmed nonetheless,
or “crammed down” the rejecting class, if certain requirements specified
52
in section 1129(b) have been met. Most significantly, a plan may be
crammed down a rejecting class only if the plan does not discriminate
53
unfairly and is “fair and equitable” with respect to that class. If the
rejecting class consists of secured claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides
that it would not be fair and equitable, and thus cannot be confirmed,
unless the plan provides for at least one of the following alternative
treatments of the secured claims in that class: (1) the secured creditors,
among other things, retain their liens on the collateral and receive
deferred cash payments; (2) the collateral is sold free and clear of the
liens, subject to the right to credit bid; or (3) the secured creditors realize
54
the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims. In particular,
section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that the following treatment must be
afforded the nonaccepting class of secured claims for the plan to satisfy
the fair and equitable requirement:

47. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (2010).
48. Id. § 1123(b)(4). The sale of all—or substantially all—of the debtor’s assets in a chapter 11
case has become common in recent years. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11
at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 675 (2003); see also Buccola & Keller, supra note 41, at 99 (“In highstakes cases, bankruptcy judges now serve primarily as auctioneers.”).
49. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1141(a) (2010).
50. See id. § 1124 (regarding impairment of claims); id. § 1126 (regarding acceptance of a chapter
11 plan).
51. See id. § 1129 (regarding the requirements for a chapter 11 plan confirmation); see also
7 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 16, ch. 1129.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
53. Id. § 1129(b).
54. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
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(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least
the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such
property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such
liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
55
of such claims.

Until recently, the majority view among commentators and courts
was that if a chapter 11 plan provides for the sale of collateral free and
clear of liens, the second alternative as set forth in section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) must be satisfied, thus affording a nonaccepting secured
creditor class the right to credit bid at the sale, rather than providing them
with an alternative treatment under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), which is
56
the indubitable equivalent of their secured claims. That is, a plan calling
for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens over the objection of the
secured creditor class must provide the same right to credit bid as the
creditor would have in a sale under section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy
Code. By affording the secured creditor the right to credit bid in a sale
under a plan, the creditor is protected against the undervaluation of its
collateral resulting from a defective auction that fails to obtain the true
market value of the property or from a judicial valuation in lieu of an
auction.

III. Two Recent Decisions Denying Secured Creditors the
Right to Credit Bid at Plan Sales
In surprising recent decisions, two courts of appeals have held that a
plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens may be
fair and equitable, and thus may be crammed down a class of secured
claims, despite the fact that the plan deprives an objecting secured
57
creditor of the right to credit bid up to the face amount of its claim.
Both appellate courts held that a bankruptcy court may use its discretion
to approve a sale of assets pursuant to a cram-down plan, even if the

55. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
56. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
57. See generally In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
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secured creditor has been denied the right to credit bid, if the court
determines that the affected secured creditor will realize the indubitable
58
equivalent of its claim under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). These courts
found subsections (i) through (iii) of section 1129(b)(2)(A) to be clear
and unambiguous in providing three separate alternatives and, therefore,
they did not give significant weight to the policy or legislative history
59
behind the enactment of these and other related sections in the Code.
A. IN RE PACIFIC LUMBER CO.
In Pacific Lumber, six affiliated entities involved in growing,
harvesting, and processing redwood timber in Humboldt County,
California, filed separate chapter 11 petitions in the bankruptcy court for
60
the Southern District of Texas in 2007. The six cases were jointly
61
administered by the bankruptcy court. The principal debtors were
Pacific Lumber Company, referred to in the case as “Palco,” and Scotia
62
Pacific LLC, referred to as “Scopac.” Palco owned and operated a
63
sawmill and a power plant in the town of Scotia, California. Palco also
64
owned Scopac, which was a Delaware special purpose entity. In 1998,
Palco transferred ownership of more than 200,000 acres of redwood
timberland, referred to in the case as the “Timberlands,” to Scopac to
enable Scopac to issue approximately $867 million in notes secured by
65
the Timberlands and certain other assets owned by Scopac. The Bank of
New York Trust Co., in its capacity as indenture trustee with respect to
66
the notes, represented the noteholders in the bankruptcy case. When
the bankruptcy cases commenced, Scopac owed the noteholders
approximately $740 million in principal and accrued interest on the
67
notes. Scopac also owed approximately $36 million to Bank of America
on a secured line of credit with a right to payment that was senior in
68
priority to the noteholders. Marathon Structured Finance held a
secured claim against Palco’s assets, which approximated $160 million,

58. See cases cited supra note 57.
59. See cases cited supra note 57.
60. 584 F.3d at 236.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 236 & n.2. The four additional debtors included: (i) Britt Lumber Company, Inc., a
manufacturer of fencing and decking products; (ii) Scotia Inn, Inc., operator of the inn in Scotia,
California; (iii) Salmon Creek, LLC, a holding company owning roughly 1,300 acres of timberland; and
(iv) Scotia Development Corp., LLC, a development corporation for exploring and facilitating
development opportunities in commercial, industrial, and residential properties in California and
Texas. These four entities and Scopac are all wholly owned by Palco.
63. Id. at 236.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 236–37.
67. Id. at 237.
68. Id.
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including amounts relating to financing extended before and after the
69
bankruptcy case commenced. Marathon estimated that Palco’s assets
were worth approximately $110 million on the date of the bankruptcy
70
filings.
Marathon and Mendocino Redwood Company (“MRC”), a
competitor of Palco, teamed up and sought to play a significant role in
the reorganization of the debtors, including making a major cash
71
investment in the companies. Together, they proposed a chapter 11 plan
that provided for the dissolution of all six debtor entities, cancellation of
all intercompany debt owed between the debtors, and the creation of two
72
new entities, Townco and Newco. Substantially all of Palco’s assets
73
would be transferred to Townco. The Timberlands and the assets of the
74
sawmill would be placed in Newco. MRC and Marathon proposed to
contribute approximately $580 million to Newco so that the money could
75
be used to pay claims against Scopac. In addition, Marathon would seek
to convert to equity its senior secured claim against Palco’s assets,
thereby giving Marathon full ownership of Townco, a 15% ownership
interest in Newco, and a new promissory note in the amount of the
76
sawmill’s working capital. MRC would own the other 85% of Newco’s
77
equity and would manage the reorganized company.
The plan provided that Marathon and MRC would fund the plan
with $580 million and that the noteholders would be paid the value of
their collateral in cash and would receive a lien on the proceeds from
78
pending unrelated litigation against the State of California. The
noteholders’ claims were bifurcated into a secured claim for the value of
the collateral and an unsecured claim for the amount of the unsecured
79
deficiency. The value of the collateral was determined by the
bankruptcy court at a valuation hearing at which it received extensive
80
testimony on valuation. Based on the testimony, the bankruptcy court
valued the Timberlands collateral at “not more than $510 million” and
held that a $510 million cash payment was the indubitable equivalent of
81
the noteholders’ secured claim with respect to the Timberlands collateral.
69. Id. at 236.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 237.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 239.
79. Id. at 238. The noteholders did not elect to have the entire amount of their claims treated as
secured claims under section 1111(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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The bankruptcy court also valued the noteholders’ liens on nonTimberlands collateral, after deducting more senior liens, at $3.6
82
million. Accordingly, the plan proposed to pay $513.6 million to the
83
noteholders in cash in full satisfaction of their secured claims. Yet the
total amount owed to the noteholders on their secured notes was
84
approximately $740 million.
The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan despite its rejection by the
class of noteholders, finding that the plan was fair and equitable under
85
section 1129(b)(2)(A) with respect to the noteholders’ secured claims.
Though the noteholders argued that the plan was not fair and equitable
as to them because the reorganization constituted a sale without
affording the noteholders the right to credit bid under subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), the bankruptcy court held that the plan transactions
constituted a “transfer” rather than a “sale” of assets, so that subsection
86
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), rather than subsection (ii), was applicable. The
noteholders appealed the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the plan,
making several arguments including that the plan constituted a sale of
the Timberlands to Newco and that, under subsection (ii), the
noteholders should have been afforded an opportunity to credit bid at
the sale of the Timberlands up to $740 million, which was the face
87
amount of their claims. The noteholders argued that allowing them to
credit bid would demonstrate that the court’s valuation of the
88
Timberlands at $510 million was inaccurate and undervalued. The
noteholders requested a direct appeal to the court of appeals rather than
going through the traditional appeal to the district court or bankruptcy
89
appellate panel, and the Fifth Circuit granted the request. The court of
appeals disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s finding that the plan
90
transaction did not constitute a “sale” of assets:
MRC, a competitor of Palco, joined with Palco’s creditor Marathon to
offer cash and convert debt into equity in return for taking over both
Palco and Scopac. New entities wholly owned by MRC and Marathon
received title to the assets in exchange for this purchase. That the
transaction is complex does not fundamentally alter that it involved a
91
“sale” of the Noteholders’ collateral.

82. Id. at 239.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 237.
85. Id. at 238–39.
86. Id. at 245.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2010) (regarding appeals of bankruptcy court orders directly to the
court of appeals).
90. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
91. Id.
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Since a sale occurred, the appellate court found that subsection
92
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) “could have applied.”
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders’ argument that,
because the transaction constituted a sale of its collateral, subsection (ii)
of section 1129(b)(2)(A) must apply so as to give the noteholders the
93
right to credit bid for the Timberlands: “This court has subscribed to the
obvious proposition that because the three subsections of [section]
94
1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives.”
Thus, the court held that subsection (iii) affords a distinct basis for
confirming the plan, without a credit-bidding opportunity, so long as the
plan offers the noteholders the indubitable equivalent of their secured
95
claims. The court recognized that subsection (ii), with credit-bid
protection, might be imperative in some cases, but not in Pacific Lumber
because the cash payment to the noteholders offered a distinct basis for
finding that the plan offered the noteholders the indubitable equivalent
96
of their secured claims.
Having held that a debtor may cram down a sale plan on a class of
secured creditors pursuant to subsection (iii) of section 1129(b)(2)(A),
which does not provide the class of secured creditors with the right to
credit bid the face amount of their claims, the court then addressed the
question of whether the plan provided the noteholders with the
97
indubitable equivalent of their claims. The court first noted that
subsection (iii) is satisfied if, with respect to a class of secured claims, the
plan provides “for the realization by such holders of the indubitable
98
equivalent of such claims.” The term “such claims” refers to the
noteholders’ allowed secured claims which, by reason of section 506(a),
do not exceed the value of the collateral securing their claims.
Recognizing that there are few judicial decisions explaining what
treatment constitutes the indubitable equivalent of a secured claim
because most cram-down plans satisfy either subsection (i) or (ii) of
section 1129(b)(2)(A), the court gave two examples of when
subsection (iii) would be satisfied: abandoning collateral to the secured

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enters.,
Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1993)). The court also noted that the three alternatives set forth
in section 1129(b)(2)(A) are not even exhaustive because the introductory phrase of section
1129(b)(2) states that the “condition that a plan be fair and equitable includes the following
requirements.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 102(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the word
“includes” is not limiting, so that a plan that complies with one of the three stated alternatives does
not assure that the court will find the plan fair and equitable.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added).
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creditors or granting them a replacement lien on similar collateral. In
contrast, issuing unsecured notes or equity securities to the secured
creditors or giving them cash that is less than the amount of their allowed
secured claims would fall short of satisfying the “indubitable equivalent”
100
standard, as would offering them a balloon payment for the full amount
of their secured claim ten years after plan confirmation, together with
101
interim interest payments but no requirement to protect the collateral.
The court, after considering these examples, focused on “what is
really at stake in secured credit—repayment of principal and the time
value of money”—and concluded that “[w]hatever uncertainties exist
about indubitable equivalent, paying off secured creditors in cash can
hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the value of the
102
Noteholders’ collateral.” But how can the appellate court know that
the bankruptcy court accurately valued the collateral if there was no
market test by auction at which the noteholders had a right to credit bid?
In fact, in Pacific Lumber there was no auction at all. Despite its
recognition that the Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership “encourages
bankruptcy courts to be wary of the shortcomings of judicial valuation
103
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
proceedings,”
confirmation order, concluding that the bankruptcy court’s judicial
determination of the collateral’s value, arrived at after an extensive
contested hearing at which eight valuation experts had testified, “is not
104
clearly wrong.”
Most significantly, the Fifth Circuit upheld a cram-down confirmation
against a rejecting class of secured creditors by paying them cash that was
less than the total amount of the debt owed to them but that was
105
judicially determined to equal the value of their collateral. Because the
99. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246. The court cited Sandy Ridge Development Corp. v.
Louisiana National Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1989),
holding that a plan that provided for the return of collateral in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s
claim, which became known as a “dirt for debt” plan, could satisfy the “indubitable equivalent”
standard. The court also cited Brite v. Sun Country Development, Inc. (In re Sun Country
Development, Inc.), 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985), and Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133, 156 (1979).
100. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246.
101. Id. The court cited In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935), where Judge
Learned Hand first used the term “indubitable equivalent.”
102. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246–47. The Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders’ argument
that depriving them of the right to credit bid and purchase the property deprived them of the
indubitable equivalent of their secured claims because it resulted in the forfeiture of the possibility of
future increases in the collateral’s value: “The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not protect a secured
creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed secured claim.’” Id. at 247.
103. Id. at 247 (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. P’ship, 526
U.S. 434 (1999)).
104. Id. at 248.
105. Id. at 249.
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appellate court concluded that the plan involved a “sale” of the
collateral, and an election to be treated as fully secured under section
1111(b)(2) is not available to the holders of recourse claims when
106
collateral is sold under a plan, the noteholders would not have had the
right to make such an election. Also, the Fifth Circuit held that the
107
noteholders did not have the right to credit bid for their collateral.
Therefore, the court held that secured creditors can be deprived of both
the right to make a section 1111(b)(2) election and the right to credit bid
for its collateral—the two primary protections against undervaluation of
collateral—with respect to a cram-down confirmation, as long as the
court is satisfied that its judicial valuation would enable the secured
creditor to realize the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.
B. IN RE PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, LLC
In February 2009, Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, and several
affiliates including PMH Holdings, LLC, the parent company of all the
debtors, filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in the Eastern District of
108
Pennsylvania. The debtors owned and operated print newspapers,
including the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Philadelphia Daily News, and the
online publication philly.com, all of which they purchased in 2006 as part
of an acquisition of the businesses by a group of mainly Philadelphiabased investors. The investor group formed Philadelphia Media
Holdings, LLC (“PMH”), which entered into an asset purchase
agreement to buy the print newspapers, the online publication, and the
109
related businesses for a sale price of $515 million. After the acquisition,
the individual who led the investor group assumed the role of the
debtors’ chief executive officer and held 6.67% of the equity of the
110
debtors. Subsequently, PMH became one of the debtors in the chapter
111
11 cases.
In order to finance the 2006 acquisition, PMH borrowed
approximately $295 million from a group of lenders, with Citizens Bank
of Pennsylvania acting as administrative and collateral agent for the
112
lenders. As part of the loan transaction, the lenders were given a
113
security interest in substantially all of the debtors’ assets.

106. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2010).
107. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
108. The cases were jointly administered by the bankruptcy court. See In re Phila. Newspapers,
LLC, 599 F. 3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
109. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.
2010).
110. Id.
111. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301.
112. In re Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 553.
113. Id.
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On August 20, 2009, the debtors filed a plan of reorganization that
provided for the sale at public auction of substantially all of the debtors’
114
assets free and clear of the lenders’ security interest. At the same time,
the debtors signed an asset purchase agreement with a “stalking-horse”
115
bidder, Philly Papers, LLC. The asset purchase agreement, which was
subject to bankruptcy court approval, gave Philly Papers the right to buy
the assets only if a higher and better offer were not made at the
116
auction. Philly Papers is comprised of several equity investors that had
a relationship with the debtors, including Carpenters Pension and
Annuity Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity, which held a 30% equity
117
interest in PMH. In addition, the person who was chairman and an
equity owner of Philly Papers owned approximately 20% of the equity in
118
PMH prior to the bankruptcy case.
The debtors’ chapter 11 plan provided for a cash distribution of
approximately $37 million to the secured lenders, which is the amount
that would have been generated from the sale of assets to Philly Papers,
119
assuming that there were no higher and better bids. Under the plan, the
secured lenders would also receive the debtors’ Philadelphia headquarters,
valued at $29.5 million, subject to a two-year rent-free lease for the entity
that would operate the newspapers. The total recovery to the secured
creditors under the plan was approximately $66 million in total value, far
less than the more than $300 million that was owed to the lenders at that
120
time. The secured lenders also would receive any additional cash
121
generated by a higher bid at the public auction.
On August 28, 2009, the debtors filed a motion to approve bidding
procedures for the public auction, which required that any qualified
bidder fund its purchase in cash and expressly precluded the secured
122
lenders from credit bidding for the assets. In particular, the proposed
bidding procedures included the following statement:
The Plan sale is being conducted under section[s] 1123(a) and (b)
[and 1129] of the Bankruptcy Code, and not section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code. As such, no holder of a lien on any asset of the
Debtors shall be permitted to credit bid pursuant to section 363(k) of
123
the Bankruptcy Code.

114. Id. at 553–54.
115. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
116. Id. at 302.
117. In re Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 554.
118. Id. Penn Matrix Investors, the third entity investor in Philly Papers, LLC, did not have an
equity interest in PMH Holdings, LLC, and did not have any prior affiliation with the debtors before
the consummation of the asset purchase agreement. Id.
119. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citation omitted).
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The secured lenders, as well as the U.S. trustee and other parties,
124
filed objections to the bidding-procedures motion. The lenders argued
125
that they had a right to credit bid for their collateral. In response, the
debtors argued that denying the secured creditors the right to credit bid
126
would create a more competitive bidding auction. The debtors asserted
that they had engaged in extensive nationwide marketing to ensure that
the results of the auction provided the best possible purchase price for
127
the sale of the debtors’ assets. However, the committee of unsecured
creditors filed a separate motion challenging that statement and seeking
an order directing the debtors to cease a publicity campaign using the
mantra “Keep It Local” on the grounds that the campaign was intended
to suppress competitive bidding by dissuading out-of-town bidders from
purchasing a local Philadelphia newspaper business, thus skewing the
128
auction in favor of Philly Papers.
The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ motion seeking approval
of the bidding procedures that would ban the secured lenders from credit
129
bidding at the asset sale. In denying the motion, the bankruptcy court
noted that, until the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Lumber, the “clear
weight of authority supported the [secured lenders’] position on the
130
issue,” and that the Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged that “[t]he nature
of this cramdown and the refusal to apply [section] 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) to
131
authorize a credit bid are unusual, perhaps unprecedented decisions.”
The bankruptcy court agreed with the secured lenders’ argument
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) should be read in tandem with sections 363(k)
132
and 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined
that, from a review of the legislative intent regarding sections 363(k),
1111(b), and 1129(b)(2)(A), the sale of the collateral by the debtors

124. Id.
125. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
126. Id. at 555.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 555 n.10.
129. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *26 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. Oct. 8, 2009), rev’d, 418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
130. Id. at *17–18 (citing In re Matrix Dev. Corp., No. 08-32798-tmb11, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1972,
at *8 (Bankr. D. Or. July 16, 2009); In re SunCruz Casinos, LLC, 298 B.R. 833, 839 (Bankr. S.D. FIa.
2003); In re River Vill. Assocs., 181 B.R. 795, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Kent Terminal Corp.,
166 B.R. 555, 566–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Orfa Corp. of Phila., Nos. 90-11253S, 90-11254S,
90-11255S, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1952, at *17–20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1991); In re 222 Liberty
Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); H & M Parmely Farms v. Farmers Home Admin.,
127 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990); In re Realty Inv., Ltd. V, 72 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1987)).
131. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 243 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *25.
132. In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *18–19 (“[T]he Criimi Mae Court did
not consider the interplay between Code section 363(k), 1111(b) and 1129 [of the Bankruptcy
Code] . . . .”).
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required that the secured creditors have the right to credit bid the face
133
amount of their claims at the auction. The bankruptcy court also noted
that while the proposed plan proceeded under subsection (iii), the
“indubitable equivalent” subsection of section 1129(b)(2)(A), it was
structured as a subsection (ii) sale in every respect other than the right to
134
credit bid.
According to the bankruptcy court, if a debtor may satisfy
subsection (iii) through a public auction without affording the secured
creditor the right to credit bid, it would be illogical for Congress to enact
the statute to provide for subsection (ii) as an alternative to subsection
135
Effectively, subsection (iii) would render subsection (ii)
(iii).
136
superfluous. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the
137
secured creditors and denied the debtors’ bidding procedures motion.
The district court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court,
holding that the plain language of section 1129(b)(2)(A) does not
provide that secured creditors are entitled to credit bid at a cram-down
138
plan sale. Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Pacific Lumber, the
district court focused on the plain language of subsections (i) through
(iii) and reasoned that the three routes to plan confirmation under a
cram-down plan sale are independent avenues separated by the
disjunctive “or,” therefore rendering each prong independently sufficient
139
for confirmation of a plan as “fair and equitable.” The district court
relied on the fact that the right to credit bid was not incorporated into
subsection (iii) by Congress and viewed the use of the “indubitable
equivalent” standard as an “invitation to debtors to craft an appropriate
treatment of a secured creditor’s claim, separate and apart from the
140
provisions of subsection (ii).”
The secured creditors appealed the district court decision to the
Third Circuit and, pending resolution of the appeal, the court stayed the
141
142
auction. In affirming the district court’s order, the Third Circuit

133. Id. at *20–21 (citing 124 Cong. Rec. S17420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini); 124 Cong. Rec. HU, 104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
134. Id. at *19–20.
135. Id. at *14 (“[T]he Court disagrees with the proposition that, although § 1129(b)(2)(A)
specifies three alternative means by way of which a reorganization plan may be confirmed, the last of
these three (indubitable equivalence) may be employed when the exact means by which the plan
intends the indubitable equivalent cramdown of a dissenting secured creditor is a cash out of the
creditor via an auction sale such as is provided for in detail under the second of the three described
alternatives.”).
136. Id. at *14–15.
137. Id. at *30–31.
138. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
139. Id. at 567 (“The use of the connector ‘or’ in section 1129(b)(2)(A) supports the conclusion
that the three alternatives are to be applied in the disjunctive.”).
140. Id. at 568.
141. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2010).
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found no statutory basis to conclude that subsection (ii) is the sole
provision under which a debtor may seek to confirm a cram-down plan
sale under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, reasoning, as
did the district court, that section 1129(b)(2)(A) is phrased in the
disjunctive and the use of the word “or” in the statute operates to
provide alternative means for a debtor to provide the secured creditor
143
“fair and equitable” treatment. The Third Circuit found the language
of section 1129(b)(2)(A) unambiguous and, based upon the plain
meaning of the statute and recent precedent, namely the holding in
Pacific Lumber, affirmed the decision of the district court and concluded
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that a cram-down plan sale can be
confirmed as “fair and equitable” under the “indubitable equivalent”
standard pursuant to subsection (iii), rather than by providing the
144
secured creditor the right to credit bid under subsection (ii).
It is important to emphasize that the Third Circuit did not find that,
under the particular facts of the case, a public auction without the right
to credit bid will result in the secured lenders receiving the indubitable
equivalent of their secured claims. It did not go that far in its holding.
Indeed, the court cautioned that “our holding here only precludes a
lender from asserting that it has an absolute right to credit bid when its
145
collateral is being sold pursuant to a plan of reorganization”:
Both the District Court below and the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Lumber
contemplated that, in some instances, credit bidding may be
required . . . . [A] lender can still object to plan confirmation on a
variety of bases, including that the absence of a credit bid did not
146
provide it with the “indubitable equivalent” of its collateral.

Judge Thomas L. Ambro, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with
the majority’s view that the language of section 1129(b)(2)(A) is
unambiguous:
I cannot agree that the plain language of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is
unambiguous and compels the sole interpretive conclusion they see as
the plain meaning of the words. There is more than one reasonable
reading of the statute, and thus we cannot simply look to its text alone
147
in determining what Congress meant in enacting it.

142. Id. at 304.
143. Id. at 305 (“The use of the word ‘or’ in [section 1129(b)(2)(A)] operates to provide
alternatives—a debtor may proceed under subsection (i), (ii), or (iii), and need not satisfy more than
one subsection.”).
144. Id. at 313–14.
145. Id. at 317.
146. Id. at 317–18.
147. Id at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting). Disagreement over the plain meaning of section
1129(b)(2)(A) “indicates that the provision is ambiguous when read in isolation and does not have a
single plain meaning.” Id. at 322. “[B]oth the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court read [section
1129(b)(2)(A)] in a plausible fashion, yet came to the opposite conclusions. Reasonable minds can
differ on the interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) as it applies to plan sales free of liens.” Id.
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Based on his review of established canons of statutory interpretation,
the entire Bankruptcy Code, and the Code’s legislative history, Judge
Ambro concluded that a plan providing for the sale of collateral free and
clear of liens may be crammed down a nonaccepting class of secured
creditors only if the secured creditors are provided the right to credit bid
148
the face amount of their claims under subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Judge Ambro views subsections (i) through (iii) as three distinct
ways in which a debtor can seek confirmation of a plan that is rejected by
a class of secured creditors, but the application of each subsection
depends on how the plan proposes to treat the claims of the secured
149
creditors. That is, subsection (i) applies where secured creditors retain
their liens securing their claims, and subsection (ii) applies where the
150
plan provides for a sale free and clear of liens. Last, subsection (iii) can
be viewed as a catch-all provision for the protection of secured creditors
151
only when subsections (i) and (ii) are not clearly applicable.
To arrive at that proper reading of section 1129(b)(2)(A), Judge
Ambro wrote that it is necessary to look beyond plain meaning and to
analyze that section in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code as a
152
whole. Three related provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, sections
1123(a)(5)(D), 363(k), and 1111(b), when taken together, “are integrated
parts of congressional policy pertaining to secured creditors’ rights when
153
their collateral is sold.” In particular, the dissent viewed sections
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1111(b) as alternative protections for the secured
creditor, one to apply at a sale free and clear of liens and the latter to
154
apply when the secured creditor’s collateral is retained by the debtor.
When these provisions are viewed in conjunction, they are “part of a
comprehensive arrangement enacted by Congress to avoid the pitfalls of
undervaluation . . . and thereby ensure that the rights of secured
creditors are protected while maximizing the value of the collateral to the

148. Id. at 338.
149. Id. at 325 (“Congress did not list the three alternatives as routes to cramdown confirmation
that were universally applicable to any plan, but instead as distinct routes that apply specific
requirements depending on how a given plan proposes to treat the claims of secured creditors.”
(footnote omitted)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 326 (citing CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 49–51
(E.D. Pa. 1996)). In CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., the debtors’ plan provided for
a combination of reduced collateral and partial immediate payment to be provided to the secured
creditors, rather than for the sale of the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of liens. Id. at 326
n.13. According to Judge Ambro, in CoreStates Bank the debtors’ cram-down plan sale could be
confirmed under subsection (iii) because the debtors were not seeking to sell the secured creditors’
collateral free and clear of liens. Id.
152. Id. at 331.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 334.
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estate and minimizing deficiency claims against other unencumbered
155
assets.”
Judge Ambro also discussed the consequences of applying
156
subsection (iii) to cram-down plan sales free and clear of liens. If
bankruptcy courts allow a debtor to cram down a plan sale on the
secured creditor without the right to credit bid, debtors will pursue
confirmation under subsection (iii) where it is advantageous to the
157
debtor, even where such a sale does not maximize value for the estate,
thus undermining the fundamental policies of the Bankruptcy Code “by
skewing the incentives of the debtor to maximize benefits for insiders,
158
not creditors.” Moreover, if a cram-down plan sale can be achieved by
a debtor outside of subsection (ii), then a secured creditor’s collateral
may be undervalued and the secured creditor may “lose the only
undervaluation protection Congress provided and considered in the sale159
free-of-liens scenario.”
The dissent also noted that secured creditors take into account the
protections provided under the Bankruptcy Code, including the right to
credit bid, before extending credit to a borrower, and that the majority’s
ruling, which is a departure from established expectations of secured
160
lenders, harms this right. Judge Ambro warned that secured creditors,
in order to account for the possibility of being denied their right to credit
bid, may provide an upward adjustment to their pricing, which will lead
161
to higher interest rates for borrowers or to reduced credit availability.
The consequences of the Third Circuit’s decision “include upsetting
three decades of secured creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost
162
of credit.”
Judge Ambro also commented on the particular facts of the case
and noted that the only party that would benefit from undervaluation of
the collateral at the auction is the purchaser of the assets, ostensibly
Philly Papers, the stalking-horse bidder with substantial insider and
163
equity ties to the debtors. According to Judge Ambro, the stalking-

155. Id.
156. Id. at 336.
157. Id. (“If the debtors here prevail, a direct consequence is that debtors generally would pursue
confirmation under clause (ii) only if they somehow concluded that providing a right to credit bid as
required by that clause would be more advantageous to them than denying that right.”).
158. Id. at 337.
159. Id. at 334.
160. Id. at 337 (“[S]ecured credit lowers the costs of lending transactions not only by increasing the
strength of the lender’s legal right to force the borrower to pay, but also . . . by limiting the borrower’s
ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment.” (alternation in original)
(quoting Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 683
(1997))).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 338.
163. Id. at 336.
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horse bidder appeared to be attempting to purchase the assets as cheaply
as possible—an outcome that is more likely if the lenders are deprived of
164
the right to credit bid at the auction. Though the lenders could submit a
cash bid at the auction, which essentially would be writing a check to
themselves, Judge Ambro pointed out that there are coordination
difficulties involved in a large syndicated loan that could present
165
obstacles to multiple lenders making an effective cash bid.
As did the majority, Judge Ambro emphasized that the Third
Circuit’s decision did not finally determine whether the lenders are
receiving fair and equitable treatment under the proposed chapter 11
plan:
In any event, I do not take the majority opinion to preclude the
Bankruptcy Court from finding, as a factual matter, that the debtors’
plan is a thinly veiled way for insiders to retain control of an insolvent
company minus the debt burden the insiders incurred in the first place.
Nor do I take the majority opinion to preclude the Bankruptcy Court
from concluding, at the confirmation hearing, that the plan (and
resulting proposed sale of assets free of liens and without credit bidding)
166
does not meet the overarching “fair and equitable” requirement.

IV. A Circuit Split: The Seventh Circuit Rejects PHILADELPHIA
NEWSPAPERS and Protects the Right to Credit Bid at Plan Sales
The momentum of the recent trend in courts of appeals toward
denying secured creditors the right to credit bid at chapter 11 plan sales
upon a finding that the sale otherwise provides the secured creditor with
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim was abruptly halted when
the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of Philadelphia Newspapers in
167
River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank.
River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, and certain related entities filed
chapter 11 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
168
Illinois in 2009. In 2007 and 2008, the River Road entities built the
169
InterContinental Chicago O’Hare Hotel, which opened in 2008. In
order to construct the hotel, the River Road entities obtained from
certain lenders construction loans of approximately $155.5 million
170
secured by a mortgage on the hotel property. The loan documents
designated Amalgamated Bank as the administrative agent and trustee
171
for those lenders. Several months after the opening of the hotel, and

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338 n.22.
Nos. 10-3597, 10-3598, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *19 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
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after defaulting on certain interest payments on the loans, the River
Road entities requested additional funding from the same lenders so that
they could complete construction of the restaurant located in the hotel
173
and make certain payments to general contractors and suppliers. When
the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the additional
174
funding, the River Road debtors filed chapter 11 petitions. As of the
petition date, the River Road debtors owed at least $140 million on the
175
construction loans.
In a separate matter, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, and certain of
its related entities filed chapter 11 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Illinois on the same day that the River Road
176
debtors filed their petitions. In 2007, RadLAX purchased the Radisson
177
Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport. In order to purchase the
Radisson, make certain renovations, and construct a parking structure,
the RadLAX entities obtained a construction loan in the approximate
178
amount of $142 million from certain lenders. Amalgamated Bank
served as administrative agent and trustee for the lenders, which held a
179
mortgage on the hotel property. Prior to the completion of the
construction for the parking structure, the RadLAX entities ran out of
funding for the project due to unexpected costs and were forced to cease
180
construction. Despite negotiations, the parties could not agree on terms
and conditions for additional funding, resulting in the filing of chapter 11
181
petitions by the RadLAX debtors. As of the petition date, the
182
RadLAX debtors owed at least $120 million on the loans.
In June 2010, the River Road debtors and the RadLAX debtors
filed their respective plans of reorganization, each plan providing for the
sale at public auction of substantially all of the debtors’ assets free and
clear of the respective lenders’ security interests, with the sale proceeds
to be distributed among creditors in accordance with their priorities
183
under the Bankruptcy Code. The debtors in both cases also filed

172. Id. at *2–3 n.2.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *3.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *5.
177. Id. at *3–4.
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. The cases of the RadLAX debtors were jointly administered by the bankruptcy court. Id.
at *5.
182. Id.
183. See River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC’s and River Rd. Expansion Partners, LLC’s Joint Chapter
11 Plan, In re River Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09-B-30029 (Bankr. N.D. III. June 4, 2010); Debtors’
Joint Chapter 11 Plan, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, No. 09-30047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 4,
2010).
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substantially similar motions to approve bidding procedures for the asset
sales, which required that any qualified bidder fund its purchase in cash
and expressly precluded the secured lenders from credit bidding for the
184
assets. In particular, both proposed bidding procedures included the
following statement:
The Plan sale is being conducted under sections 1123(a) and (b) and
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code, and not section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code. As such, no holder of a lien on any assets of the
Debtors shall be permitted to credit bid pursuant to section 363(k) of
185
the Bankruptcy Code.

The debtors’ proposed bidding procedures, which were subject to
court approval, also provided for the sale of the assets to the highest
186
bidder. The initial bid in each case would be supplied by a stalking187
horse bidder arranged during the chapter 11 cases. The River Road
stalking-horse bid was in the approximate amount of $42 million and the
RadLAX stalking-horse bid was in the approximate amount of $47.5
188
million.
Amalgamated Bank, on behalf of the lenders, filed objections to the
189
proposed bidding procedures. The bank argued that the secured
lenders had not accepted the chapter 11 plans and, therefore, that the
plans could not be confirmed because they provided for the sale of the
lenders’ collateral free and clear of liens without providing the lenders
with the right to credit bid their claims as required by subsection (ii) of
190
section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. In response, the
debtors argued that the plans were “fair and equitable” because, though
the lenders were not provided the right to credit bid their claims under
the proposed bidding procedures, the lenders would receive the
191
indubitable equivalent of their claims under subsection (iii).

184. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order: (A) Approving Procedures for the Sale of Substantially
All of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment
Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice; and (E) Granting Related Relief at 21, In re River Rd.
Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09-B-30029 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 4, 2010); Debtors’ Motion for an Order:
(A) Approving Procedures for the Sale of Substantially all of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an
Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice;
and (E) Granting Related Relief at 21, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, No. 09-30047 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. June 4, 2010).
185. Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 16; Debtors’
Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 15.
186. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 12;
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 10.
187. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 9;
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 7.
188. River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners,
LLC), 651 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2011).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. In the alternative, the debtors argued that “cause” existed under sections 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)
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The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ respective motions
seeking approval of the bidding procedures, finding that the chapter 11
plans could not be confirmed as “fair and equitable” because they sought
to sell the lenders’ assets free and clear of liens under subsection (iii),
192
rather than under subsection (ii). The bankruptcy court held that the
sale of the lenders’ assets free and clear of liens under a cram-down plan
sale must comply with subsection (ii), thereby providing the lenders with
193
the right to credit bid their claims at the asset sales. In reaching its
decision, the bankruptcy court found “Judge Ambro’s well reasoned
194
dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers . . . persuasive.”
Upon the debtors’ motion, the bankruptcy court, noting that the
issue was “a matter of public importance,” certified the decision for
direct appeal to the Court of Appeals in the River Road and RadLAX
195
bankruptcy cases. In its certification, the bankruptcy judge wrote,
Under current economic conditions a large portion of chapter 11 cases
involving commercial real property progress to a sale of assets rather
than to reorganization, and many of those sales involve lenders who
are owed more than the property is worth. Whether such lenders can
196
credit bid is crucial to the outcome of the sales.

The Seventh Circuit consolidated the River Road and RadLAX
direct appeals, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, and held that cramdown plan sales for encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an auction
must satisfy the requirements set forth in subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of
the Bankruptcy Code, rather than subsection (iii), affording secured
197
creditors the right to credit bid at plan sales. In considering the prior
decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit commented,
“Given that the Debtors’ assets in this case have not gone through the
judicial valuation process and the Debtors’ reorganization plans involve
using an auction to determine the assets’ current value, it is clear that

and 363(k) to deny the lenders the right to credit bid because, among other things, the credit bids
would chill the bidding process. The court held an evidentiary hearing in connection with the debtors’
argument and found that the debtors had failed to provide any specific evidence showing that the
lenders’ credit bids would chill the bidding process. See id. at 644.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Bankruptcy Court Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion, In re River Rd.
Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029), 2010 WL 6634603 at *3.
195. See Certification for Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 2, In re
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029); see also 28 U.S.C.
§158(d) (2010) (providing for direct appeals to the applicable court of appeals).
196. See Certification for Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 2–3, In re
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029).
197. In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 645, 653. Prior to its review of the substantive
appeals, the Seventh Circuit denied the lenders’ argument that the issues raised in the debtors’ appeals
were moot. Id. at 645–47.
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Philadelphia Newspapers is more relevant precedent than Pacific
198
Lumber.”
As did Judge Ambro in his dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers, the
Seventh Circuit found that section 1129(b)(2)(A) is not unambiguous
and that there are two plausible interpretations on the question of
“whether Subsection (iii) can be used to confirm any type of plan or if it
can only be used to confirm plans that propose disposing of assets in
ways that can be distinguished from those covered by Subsections (i)
199
and (ii).”
The Seventh Circuit also noted that a secured creditor, without the
opportunity to credit bid, will not necessarily receive the indubitable
equivalent of its claims pursuant to a cram-down plan sale that provides
200
the secured creditor with the proceeds from the sale: “Nothing in the
text of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) indicates that plans that might provide
secured lenders with the indubitable equivalent of their claims can be
201
confirmed under Subsection (iii).” The Seventh Circuit further stated
that an auction that prohibits credit bidding might not provide the
indubitable equivalent of the secured claim because such a plan sale
202
would not provide a “crucial check against undervaluation.” The court
listed a number of factors that create substantial risk that assets sold at
such a bankruptcy auction will be undervalued: (1) the speed and timing
of a bankruptcy auction, (2) the inability to provide sufficient notice to
interested parties, (3) an inherent risk of self-dealing on the part of
existing management, (4) the current state of limited liquidity likely to
keep potential bidders on the sidelines, and (5) the cost of putting
together a bid, which is taken into consideration when setting the amount
203
of a bid.
Applying canons of statutory interpretation, the Seventh Circuit
found that a cram-down plan providing for an asset sale can be
confirmed as fair and equitable only under subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii),
204
rather than under subsection (iii). Otherwise, subsection (iii) would
205
render subsection (ii) superfluous. The Seventh Circuit found that
cram-down plan sales can only qualify as “fair and equitable” under
subsection (iii) if such plans provide for the disposition of assets in ways
206
that are not already included in subsections (i) and (ii). To support its
finding, the court cited legislative history indicating that Congressional
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 649 n.4.
Id. at 648–50.
Id.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 651 n.6.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
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intent in drafting section 1129(b)(2)(A) was to provide three distinct
avenues to provide “fair and equitable” treatment pursuant to
207
subsections (i) through (iii).
Following the reasoning of Judge Ambro’s dissent in Philadelphia
Newspapers, the Seventh Circuit also found that depriving secured
creditors of the right to credit bid at plan sales would conflict with other
protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code for the benefit of the
208
secured creditor. Namely, the protections provided pursuant to sections
363(k) and 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, when viewed together,
protect the secured creditor where the debtor either seeks to sell the
asset that secures the secured creditor’s debt free and clear of its lien or
209
to retain possession of the encumbered asset. Consequently, the court
held that cram-down plans that contemplate selling encumbered assets
free and clear of liens at an auction must satisfy the requirements set
forth in section 1129(b)(2)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code, which includes an
210
opportunity to credit bid.
The RadLAX debtors filed a petition for certiorari, which was
211
granted by the Supreme Court.

V. Potential Consequences of PACIFIC LUMBER and
PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS
It is too early to know all of the effects of the decisions of the courts
of appeals in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, although
changes in practice have been observed already. The importance and
effects of those decisions, which can deprive secured creditors of the
right to credit bid at asset sales under a chapter 11 plan, will depend on
whether the Supreme Court adopts the reasoning of these decisions and,
if so, on how secured creditors alter their behavior.
A. Will the Supreme Court Adopt the Reasoning of PACIFIC LUMBER
and PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS?
As emphasized by Judge Ambro in his dissent in Philadelphia
Newspapers, the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered
the issue during the past three decades have held that the right to credit
bid at asset sales under a chapter 11 plan must be assured in order to
cram down a plan against a class of secured creditors. Indeed, the
212
Seventh Circuit has adopted that view in River Road. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the Supreme Court will adopt the views of the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 652 n.8.
Id. at 652–63.
Id.
Id. at 653.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011).
In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 653.
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Third and Fifth Circuits in departing from that entrenched view. In any
event, until the Court resolves the issue, there will be attempts in other
circuits to obtain court approval of bidding procedures in connection
with the sale of assets under a plan that deprives secured creditors of the
right to credit bid. Of course, unless and until the Supreme Court
resolves the circuit split, it is likely that debtors planning to resort to
chapter 11 to effectuate a sale of assets without affording secured
213
creditors the right to credit bid will engage in forum shopping.
B. Plan Sales Instead of Section 363 Sales
Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers should not affect sales
of assets under section 363(b) effectuated before a chapter 11 plan is
confirmed. Courts have not held that providing a secured creditor with
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim constitutes “cause” for
depriving a secured creditor of the right to credit bid under section 363(k).
In contrast, in the Third and Fifth Circuits, the indubitable equivalent is a
substitute for the right to credit bid only upon the transfer of collateral
free and clear of the secured creditor’s lien under the terms of a chapter
214
11 plan. Therefore, debtors desiring to sell assets without credit bidding
may wait to effectuate the sale under a plan, rather than under section
363(b) prior to plan confirmation. However, section 363 sales are
generally more expedient and can be achieved early in a chapter 11 case.
Thus, in the Third and Fifth Circuits, as well as other jurisdictions that
follow the views of those circuits, in addition to weighing both the
advantages and disadvantages of avoiding credit bidding in the particular
circumstances, debtors will need to weigh the benefits of expediency that
section 363 provides in contrast to a prolonged plan confirmation and
sale process. This is especially true where the collateral is a rapidly
wasting asset that needs to be sold quickly to achieve maximum value.
C. Round-Tripping Cash Bids for Assets Sold Under a Plan
The denial of the right to credit bid at an auction for property free
and clear of liens does not deprive a secured creditor of the right to make
a cash bid at the auction. If the secured creditor is the highest bidder, it
will purchase its own collateral for cash with its lien attaching to the
215
proceeds. As a practical matter, the secured creditor would be paying

213. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2010) (stating the requirements for venue in bankruptcy cases).
214. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 559 F.3d at 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v.
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009); see
also supra note 102.
215. In fact, the secured lenders group in Philadelphia Newspapers, after losing the appeal in the
Third Circuit, submitted the highest and best bid at the auction and purchased the property with a
$105 million cash bid. See Sophia Pearson et al., Philadelphia Inquirer Lenders Win Bankruptcy
Auction with $139 Million Bid, Bloomberg (Apr. 29, 2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
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cash only to receive it back. Though a chapter 11 plan can provide for
payment to the secured creditor over time, in such an event the secured
creditor would be entitled to interest on such payments to compensate it
216
for the time value of money. Thus, credit bidding and cash bidding
eventually should have substantially the same economic effect to secured
creditors.
For example, if collateral securing a $15 million claim is to be sold
free and clear of liens under a chapter 11 plan and the universe of
bidders is willing to bid no more than $10 million for the collateral, but
the secured creditor makes a cash bid of $11 million, the secured creditor
will receive the collateral and will have a security interest in the $11
million cash proceeds of the collateral. The cash proceeds either will be
paid to the secured creditor or will be otherwise returned in some form
that will protect the $11 million interest so that the creditor will realize
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim. In essence, the secured
creditor will be recycling the cash—paying it to the debtor only for it to
be paid back to the secured creditor. Viewed in this manner, at first
glance the deprivation of the right to credit bid may not seem to be a
substantial economic loss.
If the secured creditor is a single bank or hedge fund or a small
group of lenders, a cash bid may be feasible. However, in today’s modern
financing environment, it is common for lenders to consist of a syndicate
of banks represented by an agent, holders of debt securities in a
securitization vehicle represented by a trustee or loan servicer, or some
other structure with multiple claim holders participating in the credit
facility. In such cases, a collective action by the “lender” may require a
vote of the holders of claims and, in any case, there may be no
mechanism to compel holders to contribute the cash necessary to make a
cash bid. The lack of a way to compel multiple owners of the secured
debt under sophisticated lending vehicles to make a further investment
of cash could be an obstacle to making a cash bid.
In addition, if the lender does not have sufficient liquidity to make a
cash bid or needs to incur short-term borrowing costs or sacrifice shortterm opportunity costs with regard to other potential uses of that money,
the need to make a cash bid instead of a credit bid could prove costly for
the lender. Moreover, if the bankruptcy court finds that a judicial valuation
of the collateral in lieu of credit bidding satisfies the “indubitable
equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(B)(iii), as did the court in
Pacific Lumber, there will be no auction at which a cash bid could be
made. Therefore, depriving secured creditors of the right to credit bid

2010-04-28/philadelphia-inquirer-lenders-group-wins-bankrupcty-auction-over-perelman.html.
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
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may, as a practical matter, deprive them of any kind of bidding or may
increase the costs of making a bid.
D. Bargaining for the Right to Credit Bid as a Condition to
Providing Debtor-in-Possession Financing or Consenting to the
Use of Cash Collateral
Prebankruptcy secured lenders willing to provide debtor-inpossession (“DIP”) financing to provide liquidity to a company in
chapter 11 often have significant bargaining power in negotiating the
217
terms of the financing agreement. It is not surprising, therefore, that
such lenders usually negotiate for a certain amount of control over the
218
bankruptcy case. For example, DIP lenders often demand that the DIP
financing agreement, as well as the court order approving it, provide that
the loan may be accelerated in the event that the debtor does not file a
plan, or that the court fails to confirm a plan, within a certain time
219
period, unless the lender consents to an extension of time. Filing a plan
that does not have the secured lender’s approval may also constitute an
event of default by the debtor so as to result in the acceleration of the
220
loan agreement. It is not surprising, therefore, that following Pacific
Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, secured lenders have demanded
that, as a condition to providing DIP financing, their loan agreements
expressly provide that in the event of a sale of the collateral the secured
221
lender shall have the right to credit bid. Alternatively, the loan
agreement could provide that the filing of any plan by the debtor that
provides for the sale of the collateral without affording the lender the
right to credit bid shall be an event of default that accelerates the DIP
financing.
When a trustee or debtor in possession wants to use cash collateral
during the bankruptcy case, either consent of the secured creditor with
an interest in the cash collateral must be obtained or the court must
222
permit such use based on the secured creditor’s adequate protection.
As a condition to providing such consent, secured lenders recently have
insisted on a court order providing that the secured lender shall have the
right to credit bid in the event of a sale of the collateral under a chapter 11
217. See id. § 364 on obtaining credit.
218. Christopher W. Frost, Corporate Governance in Insolvency and Bankruptcy: A Collier
Monograph § 5 [2][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2011).
219. Id.
220. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c)(1)(B)(vi), which recognizes that financing agreements may
establish deadlines for filing a plan of reorganization, for approval of a disclosure statement, for a
hearing on confirmation of a plan, or for entry of a confirmation order.
221. See, e.g., In re Loehmann's Holdings, Inc., Nos. 10-16077–10-16081, slip op. at 22 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010); In re Blockbuster Inc., Nos. 10-14997, slip op. at 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 2010).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), (e) (2010). For a definition of “cash collateral,” see id. § 363(a).
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224

plan. For example, in In re Magic Brands, LLC, the order authorizing
the debtor in possession to obtain postpetition financing and to use of
cash collateral provided:
The Prepetition Agent (on behalf of the Prepetition Secured Parties)
shall have the right to “credit bid” the amount of the Prepetition
Secured Parties’ claims as of the date of such bid during any sale of all
or substantially all of the Debtor’s assets, including without limitation,
sales occurring pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or
included as part of any restructuring plan subject to confirmation
225
under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The practice of demanding the right to credit bid as a condition to
financing or to consent for the use of cash collateral will undoubtedly
grow and such provisions are likely to become boilerplate language in
any such agreement. However, if a secured creditor is not willing, or even
asked, to provide postpetition financing to the debtor or to consent to
the use of its cash collateral, courts following Pacific Lumber or
Philadelphia Newspapers may allow plan proponents effectively to
deprive secured creditors of the right to credit bid.
E. Increasing Litigation on the Application of the “Indubitable
Equivalent” Standard and Its Impact on the Bidding Process
Before 2009, when the right to credit bid at asset sales under a
chapter 11 plan was virtually assured, bidders assumed the risk that a
secured creditor might outbid them. Nonetheless, potential bidders were
willing to compete with the secured creditor on those terms. Though
litigation occasionally ensued over the bidding process, there were fewer
disputes to resolve because the highest and best offer would win the day.
However, since Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, if a
proposed sale of collateral under a chapter 11 plan does not have the
secured creditor’s support, and the court substitutes a judicial valuation
for the right to credit bid at an auction or approves bidding procedures
that require all bidders, including secured creditors, to make cash bids,
the court must determine that the judicial valuation or the sales price
received would give the secured creditor, in fact and as a matter of law,
226
the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s secured claim. In the case of
an auction, the court would have to be satisfied that the auction process
was fair and reasonable in its quest to find the highest and best offer. For
that reason, bidders engaging in such auctions may anticipate uncertainty

223. See, e.g., In re Blockbuster Inc., No. 10-14997, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010); In
re ClearPoint Bus. Res., Inc., No. 10-12037, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2010); In re Magic
Brands, LLC, No. 10-11310, slip op. at 21 (Bankr. D. Del. May 17, 2010).
224. No. 10-11310, slip op. at 21.
225. Id.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010).
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and delay resulting from litigation initiated by secured creditors on the
question of whether the auction process actually produced the
indubitable equivalent of the secured creditors’ claim. It is possible that
the greater uncertainty regarding the indubitable equivalent issue and
the likelihood that the parties will litigate over these issues will result in
fewer parties willing to spend the time and expense necessary to
productively engage in the auction process. Thus, the uncertainty and
litigation environment that these decisions will cause in jurisdictions
following Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers could have a
chilling effect on bidding at auction sales.
In contrast, it is possible that the elimination of credit bidding may
induce more people to engage in the bidding process because they will no
longer have the risk that the secured creditor will obtain the asset merely
by providing a higher credit bid. Secured creditors may no longer have
the advantage of being able to credit bid the amount of their debt
without having to use additional currency. Therefore, with respect to the
willingness of potential purchasers and investors to participate in the
auction process, it remains to be seen whether the discouraging risk of
litigation, delay, and uncertainty regarding the application of the
indubitable equivalent issue will be outweighed by the encouraging
absence of competition from credit-bidding secured creditors. However,
even if the absence of credit bidding would encourage others to
participate in the auction process, it would not necessarily result in a
price equal to, or exceeding, the price that would be paid if the auction
227
procedures were to allow credit bidding.
F.

Increasing the Cost or Reducing the Availability of Secured
Credit

In his dissenting opinion in Philadelphia Newspapers, Judge Ambro
warned that the consequences of depriving secured creditors of the right
to credit bid at sales under chapter 11 plans “forces future secured
creditors to adjust their pricing accordingly, potentially raising interest
rates or reducing credit availability to account for the possibility of a sale
228
Though Judge Ambro’s warning is a
without credit bidding.”
reasonable prediction, forecasting the future behavior of lenders is an
uncertain endeavor and it remains to be seen whether the loss of credit
bidding in plan sales, in and of itself, will have such an effect.

227. When rejecting the notion that allowing credit bidding chills others from cash bidding, Judge
Ambro stated that “credit bidding chills cash bidding no more than a deep-pocketed cash bidder
would chill less-well-capitalized cash bidders.” In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC 599 F.3d 298, 321 (3d Cir.
2010).
228. Id. at 337. Judge Ambro also wrote that the consequences of denying the right to credit bid
“include upsetting three decades of secured creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost of credit.”
Id. at 338.
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If bankruptcy courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits, or in other
jurisdictions adopting the views of those circuits, strictly apply a high
“indubitable equivalent” standard—which must be met if an objecting
class of secured creditors is to be deprived of the right to credit bid—it is
possible that courts will allow plans that deny the right to credit bid only
in a small minority of cases. This is especially so in the Third Circuit,
where the appeals court left the door open in Philadelphia Newspapers to
a subsequent finding by the bankruptcy court on remand that the secured
lenders would not be adequately protected under the particular facts of
229
the case without credit bidding. In addition, opportunities for some
secured creditors to negotiate for credit bidding rights as part of DIP
financing or cash collateral arrangements, and the opportunity for some
other lenders to make round-tripping cash bids, collectively may provide
sufficient protection for secured lenders generally so that any increased
litigation costs and losses to secured creditors caused by undervaluation
of collateral—either by faulty judicial valuations or inadequate auction
procedures—might not have a substantial effect, or any effect, on interest
rates or the availability of secured credit. In any event, it is too soon to
speculate on the impact the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits will
have on interest rates and the availability of credit if the Supreme Court
adopts the views of those courts.
It is also possible that Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers
may have some effect on the prices paid for secured claims in the
secondary market, especially for private equity investors purchasing
secured claims at huge discounts with the expectation of credit bidding
for substantially all assets of the company. It is doubtful, however, that
the mere possibility of the loss of the right to credit bid in connection
with a plan sale will deter distressed investors from engaging in the
business of claims trading.

Conclusion
Whenever protections for secured creditors are enhanced in the
chapter 11 process, such as by imposing tighter controls in DIP financing
arrangements, debtors are more restricted when designing plans to
achieve a successful reorganization or the most efficient and effective
sale of assets. Conversely, when secured creditor protections are relaxed,
such as by depriving them of the right to credit bid and exposing them to
greater risk of undervaluation of their collateral, debtors and other plan
proponents are afforded greater flexibility in designing chapter 11 plans.
Thus, to some extent, recent Third and Fifth Circuit decisions chipping
away at the right to credit bid have shifted the rights of lien holders as
against the rights of financially troubled borrowers in a way that affords
229. Id. at 317–18.
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greater flexibility to debtors. Though it is too early to know the impact of
this rebalancing on the cost of credit or the behavior of secured creditors
or claims purchasers—or even whether the Supreme Court will follow
the lead of the Third and Fifth Circuits, rather than the Seventh Circuit,
and allow all-cash bidding procedures or judicial valuation to substitute
for credit bidding—the loss of the right to credit bid at plan sales tips the
scales toward debtors when formulating and negotiating chapter 11 plans
that provide for the sale of assets.

